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dispose of private property; thus interpreted, the principles have been recruited to the same service as any ahistorical and a priori positivism or natural-law theory. But it is obviously an anti-historical method, for all its privileging of past authority (and despite the fact that much valuable historical research was done, as it were on the side, by those who believed in it.) As a method, it casually links together records from completely different periods and contexts as evidence of the same timeless principles. Its only notion of historical change is of lapses from and restorations of the true constitution.
(b) The second method, given somewhat variant forms in Hale, Burke, and Savignyls Historical School, seems at first much friendlier to history; and of course Hale and Savigny and Savignyls disciples did distinguished historical work. But the story of legal change as one in which law (mostly) unconsciously records the spontaneous underground modifications of thousands of particular customs to adapt to changing circumstances, can be extremely resistant to historical analysis. Hale's view in fact seemed to be that the history of the common law was unknowable, since it has been fed by so many springs and sources over so long a time; one can never say therefore whether a given application is of fresh or ancient origin, and what contextual influences or causes may have shaped it. Moreover on this view the authority of law lies in its unbroken continuity, which repels any type of historical account of discontinuous change. The German school had no doubt that legal history was acessible to science; but ultimately for many members of that school the aim of studying multiple manifestations of legal forms over time was once again to distill their essential core of principle, to weed out the inessential (the arbitrary, anomalous, purely contingent debris of history) from the essential; and, once this was done, to abandon historical inquiry altogether for the more urgent task of weaving the historically-derived principles together into a System. Much conventional legal argument of the last two centuries has relied on a lazy synthesis of these two competing views,. seeing law as both unchanging in root principles and adaptive in particulars; and has combined the two views with a vulgarWhiggish notion of law as progress, so that, by means of gradual adaptation, the ancient and.essentia1 principles of legal order are ever more efficiently realized (with some allowances for lapses and setbacks) in practice. In this synthesis, legal history is written as the story of the genetic ancestors or "originstt of the legal forms of the present, and of the gradual developing of these embryos into their mature modern condition.
was the historiography of the ncomparative methodw of study, by means of comparative legal history as well as anthropology and linguistics, of societies from the relatively "primitivew to the most wadvancedw, with the purpose of discovering the laws governing the evolution of wprogressivem societies.
(In fact some of the great contributors to comparative evolutionary theory were lawyers like Adam Smith and Henry Sumner Maine.) This symbiosis held enormous advantages for both history and law. Lawyers could at last both write history without falling into anachronism, and use it without threatening the conservatizing functions of their vocation. By the mid-nineteenth-century, it was no longer necessary to insist that private property had been the basis of ancient societies in order to legitimate it as the basis of modern societies: communal property simply belonged to an earlier vstageN, and was functional to society in that stage as absolute-individual property was functional to civilization in its present and more advanced condition.' Such studies, if their subtleties were pruned away, were also congenial to vulgar-Whiggish views of legal evolution as a central component.of the simultaneous progress of commerce, liberty, and science. So useful in fact has this mode of history --progressive societies evolve in stages, and in each stage develop legal forms that are functional to their social needs --been to lawyers that it has remained the dominant mode in legal argument and scholarship in this country ever since, even after many of the universalistic and deterministic premises on which it is based have been blasted away by scholars in other fields. But the lawyers often adopted the mode of thinking behind evolutionary functionalism without making any conmi.tment to continuing the type of research on which that thinking was based; thus for the most part the promise of Smith's and Maine's efforts, that lawyers might develop a tradition of comparative historical sociology, was never fulfilled. The work of scholars like Mommsen and Weber and Vinogradoff, for example, was almost completely ignored by legal scholars in their own time, and no attempt was made to integrate it into conventional legal argument. (Gierke's work on mediaeval associations as "grouppersons" is a remarkable exception to this tale of neglect; it supplied the materials for reconceptualizing corporate personality in the era of giant concerns.) So instead of continuing to investigate the relations between changes in legal and in social forms, most legal writers were content simply to 4~e e especially Stein, Legal Evolution.
his is not to say that at the time these historical conclusions were not violently controversial. On the nineteenthcentury debates among historians and lawyers on the history of property and its legal forms, see especially Grossi, Alternative to Private Property; and J.W. Burrow, I1The Village Communitym, in... assume that such relations existed, and that they were (save for some instances in which legal change "laggedn behind social and economic change) functional. (A common reason for ignoring context --social history --in the writing of legal history was was simply to posit that courts or jurists have been the authoritative recorders of customary practices, the best and truest representatives of the Volk, so there was no need to go behind their writings. One could even take this view if one believed --as Holmes for example did --that legal change was conflictual and Darwinian, rather than harmonious and consensual; the courts and jurists simply registered the outcome of the struggle, the practices of the winners.) The social change that supposedly drives legal change through its functional requirements thus tends to appear in legal writing only as vaguely specified background processes or "forcesw --"the decline of fedualismn, Nmodernizationww, "the rise of industrial capitalismw1, "the growth of the regulatory welfare state,Iw and so forth --rather than as richly described environmental influences.
But it would be very misleading to leave the impression that lawyers1 uses of history have invariably and necessarily been apologetic, designed to stabilize current structures and advantages with the authority of the past. Many legal-historical modes, including some of the modes just discussed, have served critical and destabilizing functions. In promoting a customary common law, Coke and his fellows were opposing to centralized royal power what could be taken, and later was often turned into, a ideology of popular pre-Norman liberties against central royal power. Smith was of course challenging the entire system of mercantilist regulation. Even Savigny, though an aristocratic conservative politically, was (as my colleague James Whitman has shown6) concerned to develop a view of Roman property principles as gradually ripening possession into ownership, in order to emancipate the German peasantry from serfdom without the need for legislation or revolution. Modern Mconservativesw like Bork appeal to the authority of the "original understandingtw in the hope of undoing a generation of settled constitutional precedent. Maitland and Holmes, among others, saw the main point of legal history as that of liberating the present from the past, by revealing how much current law was merely wsurvivalsll of ancient forms that had lost their functions, or else by showing up authority as having been rooted in a context of ugly or barbaric or obsolete social practices. They also shook up the hardening complacency of evolutionary views of history by using their research into the history of legal forms to invert the conventional patterns of wprogressivew social development: Maitland for example concluded that English law had evolved away from the wlindividualismm of mediaeval village societies towards 6~hitman, Legacy of Roman Law, Ch. 5. more cooperative and communal forms in modern associational life, Holmes that the common law had in the same period left behind its concern for individual moral culpability to treating persons as standardized units in the service of collective social welfare. The fact that lawyers may be recruited to serve different power centers and opposing economic and social interests, has meant that these critical uses of history have also found their outlets in legal argument.
Even when lawyers adopted historical models such as evolutionary functionalism for primarily apologetic principles, the resulting engagement with history could not help but bring with it destabilizing consequences. For example, when nineteenth-century historiography began to identify the Germanic collectivistic Mark rather than the Roman dominium as the "basicw or *#originalu form of European landholding, it removed one of the primary authoritative props to the order of absolute-individual ownership --even though the same historians, like Maine, had the ready response that modern needs required new forms of ownership. As Paolo Grossi has pointed out in his great study, collective forms of property through these researches acquired an entirely different status --it was no longer just a utopian fantasy or dangerous socialist projection, but represented the actual lived experience of ancestors --and, as it turned out, of quite a lot of forgotten or marginalized contemporary European communes as well. The same could be said, to cite more recent examples, of the lawyers and historians who revived the extensive history of pre-Civil War state planning to demonstrate that the New Deal violated no sanctified American tradition of laissez-faire or for that matter, of legal scholars who have been raiding the historical revival of the *Irepublicanw tradition of civic virtue in the hope of finding counterweights to the politically regnant modes of unbridled "liberalw self-serving individualism. Moreover once the lawyers had embraced history, they could not ever get rid of it, even when its company became uncomfortable. The historicizing of the legal-dogmatic categories of property relations, the acceptance of non-legal evidence regarding them, moved them into the domain of historical, sociological and political-economic analysis, where they became vulnerable to intellectual revisionists who might share none of the lawyers* stabilizing agenda.
B. Exam~les from Recent American Histories of Law
The discussion so far has been perhaps excessively abstract and taxonomic. In this section I'd simply like to match up some of the recent work in American legal history to some of the modes just'described and to say something about where this work falls on the authority-reinforcing/subverting: stabilizing/destabilizing divides. Here's a very rough, very summary breakdown.
1. There has been a remarkable resurgence --remarkable in view of its general discredit among historians and historically-minded lawyers --of literalist uoriginalismw, the urge to fix the current meaning of legal texts, especially Constitutional texts, by reference to the specific intentions of the 1787 convention (or, in some version, to the conventional understandings of its eigheenh-century ratifiers). Undoubtedly the spurs to this work have been the endless bicentennials and the band of originalist lawyers in President Reagan's Justice Department. As has usually been true of the originalist project, it is politically most serviceable when kept as a vague aspiration; when actually executed, the project of detailed reconstruction continues to yield largely alien or repellent products. It seems unlikely that most modern conservatives would be happy with a modern Constitution in which seditious libel might still be made a criminal offense; or in which Congress would share with the President primary authority over the design of foreign policy; or the military-industrial complex denounced as a corrupt patronage-bureaucracy-standing-army. It is thus perhaps not surprising that Judge Robert Bork, in his recent book the latest among many to insist on literal fidelity to the historical "original understandingw as the exclusively valid sure guide to constitutional interpretation, should fail to cite a single historian1 s work. '
The more fruitful and interesting disputes, as usual, have been over how best to recover the general principles or "spiritw of the ancient constitution --partly to shore up aspects of the present dispensation, but much more to reproach and reclaim a decadent present with the Founders1 wisdom. The more sophisticated conservatives reconstruct eighteenth-century systems less so that we can slavishly imitate the details than that we may appreciate the principles and attitudes of mind informing them: the conception of liberty as customary law restraining governmental power8; the separation of law from politics in John Marshall s jurisprudenceg; or the Federalists I marvelous balance of temperament that could combine realism about self-interest with faith in civic virtue, respect for theory with distrust of over-abstract systems, suspicion of political power with confidence that complex institutional mechanisms could both contain ambition and channel it productively, disdain for the masses with optimistic projects for educating them to responsible '~obert Bork, The Tempting of America (1989) . agents of social integration, promoting cultural and national unity and customary morality through the shared values of legalism and the Constitutional norms of liberty, property, and due process. l5 Among some Chicago lawyer-economists, customary adaptationism was for a period formalized as the ''efficiency of the common law hypothesisv1, the hypothesis being that common-law decision-making had an inherent tendency to reach increasingly wealth-maximizing or transaction-cost-reducing results over time; and considerable ingenuity went into describing the mechanisms that might explain how the common law could have relentlessly pursued economic efficiency even though its jud es obviously hadn't a clue that that's what they were doing.
Again, however, none of the right-wing schools is concerned to sanctify the present dispensation. They defend nineteenth-century corrective justice against twentieth-century redistributive justice, nineteenth century common law rules against social-welfare legislation, morals legislation against Constitutional invalidation. The closest thing to a truly Burkean state of mind, in fact, belongs to the left-liberal defenders of the legacy of the Warren Court and its reformist, wevolvingvv Constitution. ground thus gained will not be lost' again, and the gainers again dispossessed of power. There is no reliable trend towards ever-.increasing pluralism, incorporation of new groups into the economy and polity as equal players: rather there are periods of struggle for incorporation, oftei followed by periods of intense reaction, sometimes xenophobic and hysterical, sometimes quite nicely.calculated by established powers. purposes, how they develop counter-constitutions in the shadow of mainstream ideas of law and order. Some of those counterconstitutions eventually achieve dominance themselves; some are crushed or coopted and lost to history. This is history that, as the best Liberal history also does, incorporates the Legal Realists' and legal sociologists' insights that the law of any period isn't a fixed constellation of rules, articulated from the top, but a plastic medium whose actual content is fought over and practically shaped by thousands of interpreters, at all levels of society.
Yet the Radical's picture of legal history as the struggle, often unsuccessful, of the subordinated for a place in the sun has not proved an entirely satisfying solution to the perpetually vexing problem of making history politically and professionallyuseful without betraying its complexity and historicity. Some of the problems:
(a) The perspective of identification with the subordinated sometimes unacceptably reifies, demonizes, or treats as a monolith the dominant groups and their order. A legal system, like an economy, is much more than an elaborate mechanism for exploiting the downtrodden. Dominant groups aren't just monsters using every trick they can find to hold on to wealth and privilege. They would not usually have remained dominant without the ability to develop formidably plausible ideologies and social practices justifying the continuation of the systems that maintain them. Their actions too are constrained, by economic structures, market conditions, political coalitions, legal options, and the imaginative range of their culture. They are often confused and divided among themselves. One needs to achieve at least enough sympathy, however provisional, with dominant legal cultures in order to understand both their plausibility, their power to organize perceptions of reality for those who held them, and also their constraining force, the ways in which they helped to define and limit self-interest. 3 8~h a t this was both the overt and intended aim of the system does not, of course, mean that it was successful. A generation of Legal Realist critics led by Holmes pointed out that the Classical system's apparent neutrality was illusory, that it. inevitably papered over a mass of unacknowledged biases and implicit policy judgments. the main economic changes that took place were somehow inevitable. In other words, whether they are complacent or critical about the development of economic institutions, they tend to portray the evolution of the institutions of modern capitalism to have been a process that was, in its essentials, fixed and determined.39 Legal change is still just a series of responses --adaptive or resistant as the case may be --to this master story of *ImodernizationW or @Icapitalist developmentt1.
Here is the place where I think the legal historians associated with the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement have added most value to the Radical account. They have stressed that a capitalist economy and its workings are in part constituted through legal rules and processes. The law defines what "private propertyg1 is, and which tlharmslg to property may be compensated and enjoined and which must be suffered in silence; it sets the ground-rules of economic conflict, marking the limits on how competitors and employers and workers may combine to do each other damage; and it supplies processes for resolving such issues (juries, administrative boards, adversary litigation, etc.) that also distribute advantages to those best able to manipulate them. The CLS historians1 main point about these legal arrangements is that the basic principles behind them are so indeterminate, and their historical interpretations so variable and multiform, that one cannot plausibly speak of a single "capitalistw order at all. A commitment to "private property rightsw in the abstract can tell you nothing about whether homeowners can stop a coal company from polluting their groundwater, downstream riparian owners can sue upstreamers for diversion, or workers or creditors or suppliers or customers have a right to participate in corporate decisions affecting their interests.
The legal system has to decide how to define the property rights in question, and to whom it will assign them; it has to decide whether the rights will be lumped together in one "ownerw or spread among many, whether they will be protectible by injunction or only by damages, or not at all. In its actual history, our legal system has resolved these questions and thousands more like them in strikingly different ways, reaching contradictory answers at different times and even in the same periods; it has moved property rights around to different categories of owners, and continually abolished old rights and invented new ones. Thus in the U.S. as elsewhere in the capitalist world, there have been many actual historical capitalisms --one might add, many forms of patriarchy, many variations on the theme of white racial supremacy --and there 3g~onsidering how often wcapitalismw is invoked as an explanatory concept by people from all segments of the political spectrum, it is remarkable how few coherent accounts there are of what it is supposed to be. might have been many more. 40 Such legal histories usefully supplement work in comparative olicial economy that sharply challenges determinist accountsg1 of the emergence of such institutional forms as eventually achieved predominance in the American economy, like "FordistW methods of workplace organization or the giant multi-divisional enterprise; that argues instead that there was nothing in the least inevitable about the appearance of these particular forms, that there have been plenty of variations on them within nlcapitalistw societies, and that the emergence of particular forms has been tied to quite contingent variations in politics, ideology, culture and --not least --legal ideas and institutions. 42 The point is that our current economic and legal institutions got to be the way they are, not through some logic of linear development, but through a process rather more nearly resembling that of biological evolution. Multiple forms are continually being produced; some disappear, killed off by predators or random external shocks; some survive for contingent reasons; some are selected for certain functional purposes, then sidetracked and coopted for other purposes entirely. 
